Pathological Responses to Accounting Controls: The British Commissariat in the Crimea 1854-1856 by Funnell, W. N.
University of Wollongong 
Research Online 
Faculty of Business - Accounting & Finance 
Working Papers Faculty of Business and Law 
1988 
Pathological Responses to Accounting Controls: The British Commissariat 
in the Crimea 1854-1856 
W. N. Funnell 
University of Wollongong, warwick@uow.edu.au 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp 
 Part of the Accounting Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Funnell, W. N., Pathological Responses to Accounting Controls: The British Commissariat in the Crimea 
1854-1856, School of Accounting & Finance, University of Wollongong, Working Paper 5, 1988. 
https://ro.uow.edu.au/accfinwp/139 
Research Online is the open access institutional repository for the University of Wollongong. For further information 














It has become widely recognised that the plight of the British
Army in the Crialea (1854-6) was due primarily to unpreparedness.
This had been induced by the pursuit of extreme economy In military
spending by consecutive governments In the 'great peace' following
the Napoleonic Wars. What has not been realised sufficiently,
however, is that the consequences of this s tr ident economy were
profoundly co.pounded by the system of military accounting and
financial con trol adain f s tered by the Treasury. Thus, it was the
inflexibility of the system of financial control which accentuated
and which was directly responsible for the continued diff lcul ties of
the army in the Crimea.
PATHOLOGICAL RESPONSES TO




The exten t of the inepti tude which charac tel' I sed the conduc t of
the Crimean War (1854-1856) by the British was such that it "has
become a byword for disaster, gross mismanagement and incompetent
leadership"l which, according to Barnett2 has made it "one of the
compulsive subjects of British historical writing". I twas, wro te
Florence Nightingale, "calamity unparalleled
of calallity",3
in the history
At the time. the causes of the calami ties which befell the
British Army were initially attributed to individuals until it
became accepted that, whilst deficiencies of individuals certainly
contributed to dHf iculties experienced. the major cause could be
traced to financial considerations. 4 Extreme parsimony. in military
spending. was the order of the day, 5 Sir Charles Stephenson, in a
letter to his brother on March 5, 1855 accused the Government of
having
a heavy account to answer for. They have been to this army .. ,
a greater enemy." than the Russians; ,., they have, in short,
done what I deea it impossible for a Russian army to do -
annihilated the British army. . . 6
Sidney Herbert, Secretary at War, only too readily agreed that
the responsibility for the then present state of military
preparedness was
the fault of every parliament; we have always had the same
stereotyped system of economy in military affairs '" I all as
much to blame as anyone ... I say ... it has been the fault of
all parties, all administrations, every parliament ... On one
(thing) they have agreed, .. , improvident economy.7
2.
National indifference towards the state of the army and
be traced to these sources but more especially to the traditional
"National
transcendedSir Edward Coffin,urged General
The ca IaeI ty of the Cr illea was so monstrous and so avoidable
military manifest themselves in a preference for cheeseparing
individuals, departments and Government. 8 Indeed, the deficiencies
accounts and a grossly centralised and minutely regulated financial
econo.y,lO obsessive surveillance of lIilitary finance through
in the preparation for the aaintenance of the troops can, in part,
that blame,
indifference", argued Sir Edward, must be held in the first place to
be culpable for the surfering in the Crimea. 9
constitutional fears steaaing mainly froa an aversion to the
consequences of lIaintaining standing armies in peace.
and slowly eroded British suspicion of the consti tutional
adainistration in the hands of civilians. Each had its part in the
tragedy enacted in the Crillea.
SUPPLY AND THB ARMY IN THE CRIJIBA
The Co..ls8ariat
Supply of the essentials of life to the army was the
responsibility of the Co.aissariat. The COllmissariat was a civil
department under the direct control of the Treasury,11 to which the
Co..issariat directed all its allegiance, until Decellber 1854 when
it passed into the hands of the War Department where it remained
under civilian control and Treasury regulations continued
unabated .12 As a consequence of the Commissariat's civilian
autonollY froll ultillate lIilitary authority Lord Haliburton,
despatched to Turkey to join the Commissariat in 1855, described
how
the position of the civilian in constant contact with
soldiers who grudgingly recognised his rank and authority, was
anoaalous and unsatisfactory. I 3
Treasury accentuated regulations and meticulous accountability at







The overriding consideration in all Commissariat work
CommissariatThe
was an obsessive concern for following Treasury regulations.
meant that, while the Commissariat's task of maintaining the troops
in the field was dlff icult enough, the CODlmissarlat "was so tied
down with orders, and so cramped with surveillance, that its
energies were greatly diminished".18 Minute documentation was
required to support and evidence each transaction conducted by the
Commissariat, its members being charged "with every article
received, In short, there is not an article of Entry or Issue
but lIust be exactly immediately accounted for ... ".19
The punctiliousness required of the Commissariat would have
been comical had not the consequences been so tragic, as reported by
automatons.
Co••issariat, there were unquestionably far "too
responsibilities, too many accounts and too many masters".17
The Influence of Accounting Regulations
The training and administration of the CODlmissariat by the
transporting (at least on land) all provisions, forage, cooking fuel
and light to troops in the field outside England. The Commissariat
was also the banker for the army and the agent of the Treasury
responsible for supplying money to all branches of the military, for
the safe-keeping of specie, the issue of Bills and
for concluding, when necessary, any contracts for' supplies,14 For
every penny spent and every pound of supplies issued records had to
be kept: the officers and men of the Commissariat were held
personally responsible. 16 Given that there was a lack of adequate
staff in the Crimea and the illmensity of the task facing the
4.
Prince Albert. At a time when the British army was literally
starving to death, Prince Albert, the Royal Consort, wrote to Lord
Panmure on 10 February 1855, concerning the arrival of a boatload of
vegetables from England. Even though vegetables of any description
were especially urgently needed, when the Commissariat officer
receiving the cargo realised the cargo consisted of vegetables he
refused to accept it because, under the financial regulations of his
department, he did not have the power to purchase or accept them. 20
The Commissioners investigating Crimean supplies also referred to
this absurdity.21 Because each Commissariat officer was held
personally responsible for all receipts and issues, contravention of
Treasury regulations could prove a very costly exercise. Besides,
Com.issariat officers were trained as officers of a Treasury-
controlled department never to spend money on their own ini t IatIve ,
no matter what. 22
Equally tragic, and yet not unusual in the context of the
Crimean War, was the plight of the Medical Officer of the hospital
ship Charity. On the ship he had a large nuaber- of cholera cases,
whose suffering was aggravated by the absence of warm surroundings.
To improve conditions the Medical Officer sought to acquire some
stoves from the Commissariat. Despite the obvious urgency of the





You must make your requisition in due form,
send it to headquarters, and get it signed
properly, and returned, and then I will let
you have the stoves.
But my men may die meantime.
I can't help that; I must have the
requisiton.
It is .y firm belief that there are men now
in a dangerous state whom another night will
certainly kill.
I petty economy I, they refused or were unable to move outside the
change when the War Department took over the ComnLissariat in
Commission which was prompted to conclude in 1837 that "lhe Board of
According to Florence
5.
I real! y can do no thing; I mus l have a
requisiton properly signed before I can give
one of those stoves away.23
Rules and regulations designed for another
Mr. Augustus Stafford, on the basis of his
Commissary:
minute regulations".
lheir bookkeeping as the primal'y obj ec t of life". 27 This did noL
Treasury regulations and kept records and accounts in the pursuit of
place, another time, and conceivably for other purposes, soon became
military and civilian branches of the army.
dangerous anachronisms which retarded efficient operations of all
Treasury and most of which had been carried over fronl the Peninsula
Because the officers of the Commissariat, as befitted agents of
Procrastination in the COJllmissariat was therefore, generated by
the Treasury, would be assessed primarily on how well they met
Comnti ttee, 24 "tied and bound in the coils of excessively CODlp] ex and
financial and accounting regulations, which originated with the
War. The army's associated services were, judged the Esher
guidelines for supply as laid down in Treasury regulations. 25 This
in the supply departments there was a fear of responsibility and
managing the supply of the Army".26
had been observed much earlier than the Cr imean War by the Howick
Treasury seems par t i cu Iar-Ly unfitted by its constitution for
Nightingale the Commissariat I s offleers f lxed ..their attention upon
December 1854.
experiences in the Crimea, told the Roebuck Committee (1856) that,
exceeding regulations,28
6.
Early supply Dlanuals, and subsequent manuals, displayed a
disproportionate concern for bookwork and correspondence in
coaparLson to the attention given to the mechanics of supply. "Yet
that in itself", admits Glover when reflecting upon the 1796 supply
manual of Havilland Le Mesurier,
"was the natural result of a system under which the Commissal'y
was so much more directly responsible to a Treasury which
insisted on accurate accounting than to a Commander-in-Chief
who merely wanted his men and horses to be properly fed".29
As the military's banker and the Treasury's, and therefore
Parliament's, representative in the field it was above everything
else the duty of the Commissariat to
call to the attention of the officer commanding every
instance in which a payment aay be authorised, at variance with
established regulations, or with any particular direction of
the Treasury Board, as well as to report on the subject to the
Treasury. 30
Despite the plight of the army in the Crimea, any change In the
professional behaviour of the Commissariat, unfortunately, was
remo te . To change the habi t s of a Ii f e time in the service of the
Treasury was easier said than accomplished. For the CO"lllissariat
Officer "to suddenly cast behind every tradition of his department,
every habit to which he had been carefully trained and, in the midst
of new and arduous tasks, construct for himself a new theory of duty
and a new set of regulations" was out of the question. 3] .
Comnlissariat officers generally had no choice but to follow the
given financial instructions that were "suitable for a time of
peace, but inapplicable to a period of war, and operating unjustly
on soldiers".32
Members of the Commissariat were only too aware of the
eagerness and relish with which the army notoriously sought to blame
7.
regulations could have been readily and threatingly interpreted as
denying the wishes and directions of the off ice from which they
emanated.
In the Crimea the web of financial regulations, rules and
procedures which served to hem in the Commissariat officer became
not only the servant of the superior but of the ranks also. They
were used as a defensive fortress into which the supply off icer
could remove himself. 37 Regulations determined by central
authorities as the keystone to a highly centralised system of
administration and financial control became not, as expected, a link
in a chain of responsibility but rather a component in a chain of
subordinates for administrative failures and the alacrity with which
the Treasury superintended its own regulations. 33 History, as found
in the numerous Commissions and CORllfti ttees of Inquiry that in the
past accompanied major conflicts, had demonstrated that any excuse
in times of trouble, especially an infraction of rules or procedures
however slight or unintentioned, sufficed to unleash and legitimise
insidious persecution. 34 Members of the Commissariat therefore
endeavoured to eliminate any avoidable grounds upon which they might
be the scapegoat for operational difficulties: "their fear of their
superior officers ... was abject".35 To take the inItiative was to
risk severe censure and possibly financial ruin.
The rules and financial regulations of the Commissariat were
ultimately designed to create uniformity, regularity and ensure
conformity.36 Financial regulations enabled 'remote-controlled'
Treasury supervision; they were, if not the physical presence of
the Treasury, its surrogate, the functional equivalent of direct
As such, behaviour which contradicted Treasuryoral orders.
Commissariat officers' defence was that they could not be held
Commission, the Commissariat, displaying an apparent indifference
mandate. Financial and accounting regulations as finely detailed as
McNeil and Tulloch
8.
They "were the death of common sense".38
According to the Commissioners of the
encouraged and produced a debilitating apathy.
responsible for anything outside what they perceived as their given
tor the suffering of the army, made little effort to promote
by the plea that instructions were followed exactly as given. 39 The
those hedging the British Army's supply services therefore
which may have been attributable to inadequate supply arrangements,
irresponsibility.
Commissariat to divorce themselves from the failures of the campaign,
Financial regulations effectively enabled the officers of the
improvemen t . Minimal effort was required, stressed the
Co••issioners, to meet the outmoded supply requirements and
regulations of past campaigns and to concentrate on maintaining a
general store of supplies shipped from England, the distribution of
which "to the members in each division, Dlerely involves the simplest
operation of arithmetic".40 To do much else must necessarily be
attended with extra trouble, greater complication of accounts,
and no small personal exer t i on . It is ... natural ... that
those who have the charge of supplying the troops should cling
to the system which tends so materially to relieve their
difficulties. 41
Even when supplies were known to be available not far froDI the
Crimean battleground no-one in the Commissariat took the initiative
to acquire them. Thus, not only did the regulations facili tate
punishment but they also, therefore, defined behaviour necessary to
avoid punishment by specifying the minimum level of acceptable
performance. The financial regulations, which principally emanated
f r-on the Treasury with the express sanction of Parliament, as a
9.
were by 1855 that British casualties were attributable in no small














As it transpired, the CODIRlissioners did not find what was
the McNeil-Tulloch Commission set off for the Crimea. 44
The Ind Igna lion of the Br Lt Lsh at huae ,43 convinced as they
that the members of the supply br-anches had their heads "so
The financial regulations of the Treasury as they impinged on
ARMY ACCOUNTING AND THE ROYAL COMMISSION INTO ARMY SUPPLIES
the mode of accounting, and if the system be in your opinion
unnecessarily complicated for a period of actual warfare, you
will suggest such means of simplification as may occur to
you. 45
referred to as the 'unclassified' syslem46 of accounling used by the
Commissar ia t in any way unduly compl icated. 47 On the con t r-ary , the
have for some years been kept" showed itself to be
McNeil-Tulloch Commission, Thus, it is the purpose of the following
relationship to military performance,
directions to the Commissioners they were charged with examining
the well-spring of initiative which is the very substance of
Commissariat
system "upon which the Commissariat accounts of receipts and issue
financial
in the Crimea, Accordingly, letters patent were issued in 1855 and
section to examine the Commission I s findings concern l ng Treasury
establish a Royal Commission to enquire into the supply arrangements
flexibility and intelligent assessment where condi lions are
consequence most successfully destroyed freedom in decision making,
children all their lives",42
constantly changing, Flo['ence Nightingale observed w['yly in 1855
flattened between the boards of discipl ine that they remain old
10.
well adapted for service in the r l e l d , and hardly to admi L of
being more simple ... (for the) accounts of the Commissar-iat
Officers attached to Divisions and Brigades consist merely
of consecutive entries, or jottings, of all receipts and issues
... accompanied by the requisite vouchers. 48
Accounting procedures followed in the field during the Crimean
War were directly derived from the need to ultimately account to
Parliament for money appropriated to military uses. All accounting
practice in the Commissariat was subord Inat.ed to, and fed into,
Parliamentary needs.
The operation of army accounting as practiced in the Crimea
owed Much to the work of Sir Charles Trevelyan,49 at one time head
of the Treasury and the ComotissariaL (1840-Deceoluer 1854), who
had taken what had been a tremedously complex system of
accounts involving very detailed classifications and ill its place
instituted the simple cash account and a charge-discharge account
for stores. 50 Sir Charles had recognised, and past operations
in the field had shown, that during active service, with its intense
demands, an inordinately complex system of army accounting
invariably broke down. According to Sir Charles, the uncomplicated
and 'unclassified' system of accounts he was instrumental in
introducing in the Commissariat, when it was under the direcL
control of the Treasury, not only
answered every purpose, but was far bet tel' for purposes of
check than any more complex system that could be adopted ...
and attained the objects of a military system of accounts. 51
Despite previous improvements to, and simplificallon of, ar'my
accounts. but largely because of the uncerLainLles and urgency of a
major campaign, much to its horror the Royal Commission discovered
that the accounts constructed in the field were generally 80
inaccurate "that but little reliance could be placed upon the
mattet' how much the Commissariat's officers quaked and trembled at
The main reason for the unsat Isfac torv slate of the







McNeil and Tulloch argued that
and
The comments of McNeil and Tulloch
found in the accounts by the
the
11.





The miasma of errors,
predictability.
accounting on the charge-discharge forlll of accounts.
procedural rigidity of accounting.
circumstances slipping beyond the area covered by regulations and
inflexible, narrowly oriented form they took for the Commissariat.
anxiety and inflexibility of the Commissariat officers as they saw
McNeil-Tulloch Commission, was compounded by the emphasis in army
the prospect, could not overcome the polluting influences endemic to
war. Threats of future chastisement could only but increase the
Real or inlagined punishments for discrepancies in accounts, no
operating in peace, could not hope to meet the demands of war in the
reporting which was prescribed within rigid lines needed to be
Commissariat accounts, argued McNeil and Tulloch, was the extreme
softened with initiative.
ever worse still, dangerously deceptive.
closely scrutinised and laborious system could lle so worthless or,
manacled
confidence. Yet it seemed impossible that the end product of such a
protracted war with its extraordinary demands, despite the immense
documentation
surveillance, the accounting results were far fl'om accep tabl e . The
number of finely articulated financial and store regulations which
were scathing, possibly the worst that could be made. The
Commissioners were expressing dismay that, in the chaos of a
f t1 tur-ns" 52accuracy 0 - le ... re ur .
12.
officer was made accountable for all Lteas that entered his slore.
Once they left his store they were no longer his concern and so he
eliminated them from his books, This practice led to the curious
"habit of wri ling off as issues, nume rcus supplies wh i ch had not
been distributed to the troops, but which had been merely
transferred from the store at Balaclava to the control of the navy
in store ships in the harbour". 53 The stores then, for all intents
and purposes, ceased to exist l>ecause they did not appear in the
appeared to use no commonsense or InI tiative in the records they
made. Their one concern, which overrode any considerations of
providing a service suited to the requirements of the situation, was
to ensure they had sufficient documentation or proof to cover
theaselves given, argued the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the
"certainty of detection which the nature of the accounts
afforded,,54. The accounting procedures drilled into lhe men
responsible for supplies, the majority of whom had li ttle education
outside that afforded by their oftentimes brief ComDlissariat
encouraged blind
The storemen and Commissariat Officers
training under the 'l'r-eaaur-y ' s supervision,
attention to detail; to the unthinking application of rigid
regulations designed to ensure contco I over the minutest malters
connected with stores and cash, Any discrepancies were made the
liability of the s toreean and issuing officer. 55 They wer'e thus
"paralysed by visions of reckonings to CODle" , 56
Given the accountability requirements of Parliament, it was
not inconsistent for the Commissariat to see the purpose of
accounting records in terms of surveillance and stewardship and not
as the means to facilitate the pursuance of military victory.
Meeting the often urgent requirements necessary for the very
Commissariat's records.
13.
and discharge did not consider anything outside that wllich could be
received supplies from one direction and issued them in another; a
In other
The army
a temporary reposi tory tha L
"we were mere custodians of stores.
Evaluation of Commissariat performance
important part of their job, the mountains of paperwork.
words the CommissarLaL and the Treasury 'f iddled ' whi Le the army
, burned' . 58
policeman directing traffIc:
requirements had been met.
off ice as a turn table for supplies;
The great personal responsibility of each supply officer,
discharged through his accounts, induced a state of mind noL unlike
tha t required La participate in a game of 'pass the hoL potato'.
The Coaa.l s sat-Lat. Off icer was trained to regard himself and his
existence of those engaged in battle was considered after Treasury
We were not supposed Lo have any knowledge of them, bUL merely the
care of keeping and accounting form them".57
The seeming paradox presented by con t esrpor-ar i es at the front
of a very hard working but ineffective Commissariat call be explained
to a very large extent in terms of meLiculous attention to the
forms and reports required by Treasury regulations (and ultimately
Parliament). Not only was the Commissariat forced Lo muddle its way
through the goods as they arrived but also they had to deal with,
what was patently clear to the Commissaries the most
disclosed in reports stipulated by Treasury regulations.
did not supervise and assess the Commissariat. thus the army's
criteria for an efficient and effective Commissariat were irrelevant
to the Commissariat Officer and his men, who saw the army as
completely separate and distinct from their own organisation.
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Commissariat. From the Commissariat-General down the advantages of
a well fed and healLhy army seem Lo have been lost on the
Commissariat. 59
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